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British public employment service reform: 
activating and civilising the precariat?
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A post-industrial ‘precariat’ has emerged characterised by social insecurity to which the state’s 
response has been to secure habituation to insecure labour. This article provides new empirical 
evidence regarding how the precariat encounter and experience the reformed welfare delivery 
system. It seeks to explore theoretically whether the precariat is being ‘activated’ and/or ‘civilised’. 
The author finds that the primary role of Jobcentre Plus is to assess whether the unemployed are 
‘active’. This has been interpreted by Marxist scholars as a class disciplinary project which renders 
labour more dependent upon precarious work. However, the evidence presented here suggests 
that an inappropriate white-collar model of support combined with sanctions frequently results in 
ill-discipline and disentitlement from benefits. Furthermore, support cannot be conceptualised as 
a ‘civilising offensive’ because it is not a deliberate and targeted attempt at inculcating ‘civilised’ 
behaviour. Moreover, rather than enforcing the norms of civilised behaviour it drives many into 
destitution and crime.
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Introduction
A post-industrial ‘precariat’ has emerged (Wacquant, 2009; Standing 2011) characterised 
by social insecurity, to which the state’s response has been to re-assert class discipline 
by rendering labour more dependent on insecure work (Wacquant, 2009; Wiggan, 
2015; Umney et al, 2018). This has been accompanied by far-reaching reforms of 
the welfare delivery system. The creation of Jobcentre Plus promised a revolution 
in the way the workless would be supported by merging the Employment Service 
and Benefits Agency. However, the relationship between the reformed UK public 
employment service and emerging forms of social marginality is under-researched. 
Moreover, recent studies have focused on the compulsive aspects of welfare delivery 
(see Wiggan 2007; Fletcher and Wright, 2018) and have paid scant attention to the 































































support provided. There is also a need to enhance our understanding of the experiences 
and perceptions of those being supported and explore theoretically whether the 
precariat is being ‘activated’ and/or ‘civilised’.
The article begins by considering the emergence of the precariat and outlines its 
relation to the benefits system. It continues by outlining two variants of the new 
paternalism (‘activating’ and ‘civilising’) which seek to direct the lives of the poor in 
return for supporting them. The author outlines the role played by Jobcentre Plus 
in the transformation of welfare delivery. The findings from a study examining how 
the precariat encounter and experience such support are articulated. The author 
argues that although the primary role of Jobcentre Plus is to assess whether those 
claiming benefits are ‘active’ it has imposed a residual white-collar model of support 
combined with harsh sanctions which drive many into destitution and crime rather 
than exerting class discipline. The author argues that Jobcentre Plus support cannot 
be conceptualised as part of a ‘civilising offensive’ since it is not a deliberate attempt 
at inculcating ‘civilised’ behaviour and it results in de-civilising effects.
The precariat
A post-industrial precariat (Wacquant, 2009; Standing 2011) has emerged characterised 
by chronic insecurity. The end of the Fordist–Keynesian compromise and welfare 
state retrenchment has been accompanied by the degradation of employment 
conditions, shortening of job tenure, falls in real wages, and shrinking of collective 
protections for the working class which have been brought about and accompanied 
by a surge in precarious work (Wacquant, 2009). This stems from: ‘a new employer 
strategy of externalization of the workforce and its costs – a strategy encouraged by 
public authorities and powerfully reinforced by the active marketing of temporary 
employment agencies’ (Wacquant, 2009: 55). This has been facilitated by the shift 
from welfare to contractual workfare which operates in the manner of a labour parole 
programme designed to push its beneficiaries into poor jobs (Wacquant, 2009). The 
state presents a ‘fearsome and frowning face’ to the working class which leaves a ‘heavy 
imprint’ of discipline on welfare recipients and transforms their mentalities through 
the routine experience of threat and coercion (Wacquant, 2009: 312).
Standing (2011) views the precariat as a ‘class in the making’ comprising youth, 
migrants, criminals and disabled minorities. All aspects of work (employer, wage, 
time and conditions of work and workplace) are subject to change according to 
contingencies beyond the individuals’ control. The precariat’s relation to the labour 
market is highly opportunistic since work tends to be temporary which makes for 
a nomadic pattern of drifting. The rise of precarious forms of employment is due 
to the way in which employers have managed uneven labour demand. The risks of 
labour underutilisation have been placed on workers who can be hired and fired. 
The precariat are increasingly denied rights accorded to previous generations. ‘Its 
essential character is being a supplicant, a beggar, pushed to rely on discretionary 
and conditional hand-outs from the state and by privatised agencies and charities 
operating on its behalf ’ (Standing, 2014: 4).
Savage (2015) argues that the precariat describes those at the bottom of the emerging 
British landscape of social class and is estimated to consist of about 15 per cent of 
the British population. ‘This class has by far the lowest household income, has little 
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social ties, with few associates in higher-status occupations, and its cultural capital is 
more limited than that of any of the other classes’ (Savage, 2015: 171). The concept 
draws attention to way that vulnerability is structurally determined and situates this 
group within the wider processes of contemporary labour markets rather than fixing 
on them as being outside employment altogether (Savage, 2015).
The precariat is more accurately conceived as a re-emerging form of social 
marginality since historical analysis reveals that precarious forms of employment have 
been a recurrent feature of working-class experience. During the late nineteenth 
century, for example, the pool of casual workers lay at the heart of the unemployment 
problem: ‘The problem was really one of underemployment among many rather 
than unemployment among few’ (Whiteside, 1991: 21). The casual labourer had little 
employment security and competed in a large pool of unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour which, even in peaks of demand, was surplus to requirements and in times 
of depression grossly so (Burnett, 1994). ‘On some building sites a foreman might 
find fifty labourers pleading for a mere half-dozen jobs. It was not unknown for him 
to place six spades against a wall at one hundred yards distance. A wild, humiliating 
race followed; work went to those who succeeded in grabbing a spade’ (Roberts in 
Burnett, 1994: 171).
A key motivation for the introduction of a national system of labour exchanges 
in 1910 was the need to eliminate the use of casual labour which was condemned 
as ‘expensive, inefficient and a source of social and moral degeneration’ (Whiteside, 
2015: 155). Beveridge declared to the Royal Commission on Poor Laws in 1907: 
‘For the man who wants to get a casual job now and again, the exchange will make 
that wish impossible…The result of the exchange is the direct opposite from that 
of assisting the lazy or the incapable; it makes it harder for them to and compels 
them to be regular’ (quoted in Whiteside, 1991: 62). A century later the triumph 
of neoliberalism and the promotion of flexible labour markets have fostered 
employment practices reminiscent of the Victorian age with casual employment and 
part-time work proliferating. It is in this context that welfare reform has changed 
the way in which work is perceived; all jobs are good jobs (Wacquant, 2009). 
Consequently, policymakers are now keen to promote the acceptance of casual 
work. The launch of the Universal Credit sought to force claimants to take even 
small amounts of work and has been likened to ‘pimping the precariat’ (Dean, 2012).
The new paternalism
Economic transformation has been accompanied by the ascent of a new paternalism 
which seeks to supervise and direct the lives of the poor in return for supporting 
them (compare Mead, 1992). Paternalistic policies enforce behavioural requirements 
through close supervision. Mead has played a key role in promoting the idea of  ‘welfare 
dependency’ in the post cold-war world (Garrett, 2015). His principal concern is the 
attitudes and behaviour of the poor who, it is alleged, lack ambition and competence 
because they are ‘passive’ and ‘do little to help themselves’ (Mead, 1992: 213). This 
passivity is especially marked in the labour market. ‘The poverty of today’s underclass 
differs appreciably from poverty in the past: underclass poverty stems less from the 
absence of opportunity than from the inability or reluctance to take advantage of 
opportunity’ (Mead, 1992: 3). A refusal to work, reflecting the development of an 




















































From this perspective a curtailment of citizenship may be necessary because the 
question now becomes ‘how passive you can be and remain a citizen in full standing’ 
(Mead, 1992: 213). The task for the state is to inculcate the capacities for agency in 
the poor (‘activate’) by imposing adequate disciplinary controls. Making benefits 
conditional on the behaviour of claimants can be viewed in this context. Consequently, 
policymaking is paternalistic in that it consciously assumes a protective or ‘tutelary’ 
role in order to instil the desirable individual qualities that will produce socially 
acceptable behaviour.
The concept of the ‘civilising offensive’ developed by Eliasian scholars focuses 
on the deliberate and targeted attempts at inculcating ‘civilised’ habits. The term 
was first coined by de Rooy (1979) and describes the conscious attempts of the 
paternalistic state to alter the behaviour of sections of the population by inculcating 
‘civilised’ habits. A perceived lack of work ethic among the poor has been a key 
focus of modern ‘civilising offensives’ conducted by a paternalistic state (Mitzman, 
1987). Rodger (2012) argues that civilising offensives sponsored by the welfare state 
include actions aimed at integrating marginal groups into work. More recently, 
Van den Berg and Arts (2018) argue that Dutch legislation that allows welfare office 
staff to sanction clients deemed to ‘obstruct employment’ by their appearance is part 
of a long history of welfare state civilising offensives (Van den Berg and Duyvendak, 
2012; Van den Berg, 2016). The implementation of the Dutch Participation Act means 
that the unemployed are required to perform aesthetic labour as an explicit condition 
for the right to welfare.
This article considers whether the support pioneered by Jobcentre Plus can 
be conceptualised as a ‘civilising offensive’. The growing focus on the activation 
of the unemployed means that benefit claimants have had to engage in various 
forms of labour to prepare for re-entering the labour market. This includes regular 
mandatory contact with Jobcentre work advisers, undertaking voluntary work, active 
job search and aesthetic labour. In terms of the latter, UK Jobcentre advisers can 
instruct the unemployed, with legal authority, to take specific action they deemed 
necessary for finding work including altering personal appearance (Blackmore, 
2001). The conditions that individuals need to fulfil to remain eligible for benefits 
including the number of job applications that must be completed every week are 
set out in individual ‘claimant commitments’. At the same time Jobcentre Plus has 
implemented a job search model that requires the use of the internet to search for 
work and the adoption of curricula vitae. Disciplining the precariat to use such 
job search methods and making their use a condition for receipt of benefit has 
the hallmarks of a civilising offensive. This is because such methods are not used 
for the recruitment to precarious work which privileges personal social contacts 
(Sassen, 1996).
Jobcentre Plus: a vanguard of welfare reform
Policy reforms have been accompanied by far-reaching changes to the welfare delivery 
system (Meyers et al, 1998; Van Berkel, 2007; Wiggan, 2007; Fletcher, 2011). Jobcentre 
Plus was established in the UK following the merger of the Employment Service and 
the Benefits Agency which meant that it was given a remit to both help people into 
work and ‘police’ benefit entitlement where it applies benefit sanctions. It currently 
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across England, Scotland and Wales (NAO, 2016). Regular mandatory contact with 
advisers was a core element of the new approach. Work coaches were introduced in 2013 
and are responsible for providing frontline support to individuals and implementing 
welfare conditionality (see Box 1). This is supplemented by a number of voluntary 
schemes (see Table 1). Jobcentre Plus districts can also access the Flexible Support Fund 
to help work coaches provide additional support to help claimants move into work 
including funding travel to job interviews and clothing for interviews. However, only a 
little over half of the available £136 million in 2014–15 was spent (HoC WPC, 2016).
The type and level of support provided by Jobcentre Plus has been constrained by 
very low levels of funding; the hegemony of work-first approaches; and a preoccupation 
with performance measures principally moving people off benefits. The UK devotes 
fewer resources to labour market programmes for unemployed people than most other 
OECD countries. From 1995 to 2005 the UK spent less than 0.5 per cent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per annum on active labour market policies compared 
to around 1.5 per cent in countries such as Sweden and Denmark (Bonoli, 2010). 
Furthermore, persistent cost-cutting leaves the British system as one of Europe’s most 
frugally funded public employment services (Bonoli, 2010). From this comparatively 
under-funded starting point, Jobcentre Plus has been subject to several rounds of 
hard-hitting cuts losing at least 28,850 posts and 22 Benefit Delivery/Contact Centres 
between 2008 and 2012 (PSCU 2011; Wintour, 2011). Furthermore, between 2016 
and 2018 over 100 jobcentres – about 15 per cent of the network – has been closed 
Table 1: Jobcentre Plus support
Scheme Description
Work Clubs Provides a place for jobseekers to meet, share experiences and receive 
help in the search for work
Enterprise Clubs Provides a place for jobseekers to meet, share experiences and receive 
support with business ideas
New Enterprise Allowance Access to a business mentor and financial support (for up to six 
months) for jobseekers with a business idea
Work Together Encourages jobseekers to consider volunteering as a way of improving 
their employment prospects
Work Experience Work placements for young people
Sector-based Work Academies Pre-employment training and guaranteed job interviews
Box 1: The Work Coach role
Work Coaches are front-line staff based in Jobcentres with the following responsibilities:
• agreeing ‘Claimant Commitments’ with new claimants setting out the 
conditions that they need to fulfil to remain eligible for benefits, and making 
sanction referrals if claimants fail to fulfil these; 
• supporting claimants into work by motivating, providing advice, and using their 
knowledge of labour markets; and





















































which has led to protests and strike action (Finn, 2018). The creation of Jobcentre 
Plus reinforced a move away from training and public employment programmes 
towards low-cost measures for immediate job preparation (Fletcher, 2000). Benefit 
off-flow performance measures have been found to incentivise some Jobcentres Plus 
offices to discourage people from claiming benefits. Plaistow Jobcentre managers, for 
example, encouraged aggressive approaches to improve benefit off-flow including 
falsely signing claimants off benefits and misusing the Flexible Support Fund to cover 
gaps in benefit payments (WPC, 2016).
The present research
The findings presented here emanate from a study which was independent of any 
governmental agency although researchers were dependent on local community and 
voluntary organisations (some receiving state funding) to access some participants. In 
addition to key informant interviews and focus groups, the study comprised qualitative 
longitudinal research in 10 case study towns and cities in England and Scotland with 
481 Wave A welfare participants drawn from nine groups including ex-offenders. 
Individuals were interviewed on three separate occasions over a two-year period, 
focusing on their experiences of support and sanctions within the welfare system. 
This article is based on the first wave of 57 interviews with people with a criminal 
record conducted in 2015 and a focus group of six welfare practitioners including 
two Jobcentre Plus staff. It is important to acknowledge the limitations of interview 
techniques and, specifically, how individuals in stigmatised social positions often 
articulate their views and experiences in response to such stigmatisation (Goffman, 
1974; Dean and Taylor Gooby, 1992).
All interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. QSR NVivo 10 was used to 
manage the data. The complex multi-site and multi-team research design offered 
challenges for data management and analysis. All researchers who conducted 
interviews assigned attributes for those transcripts. A two-tier approach to coding 
was used, with a team of coding officers applying the first tier of framework matrix 
coding across the offender sample. The matrix coding was assembled inductively 
by a working group of the project Principal Investigator, a co-investigator and 
researchers drawn from the range of institutional teams involved. The second tier 
of coding was conducted by the authors on the offender sub-set. Key themes 
were identified from a close reading of a selection of transcripts, which were 
then coded across the sample. This was supplemented by text searches to verify 
the representativeness of findings and to identify data that did not fit the main trends.
Criminals have been explicitly identified as a key constituent of the precariat 
(Standing, 2001). The possession of a criminal record and residence in a selected 
geographical case study area were essential sampling criteria. More than three-
quarters of interviewees (79%) were male and three quarters (74%) aged between 25 
and 49 years. Virtually all (93%) described themselves as ‘white’. Many had worked 
in low-skilled, manual jobs in manufacturing and construction. Most were seeking 
similar work. All were claiming benefits at the time of the first interview. A third of 
interviewees were receiving JSA with the remainder in receipt of ESA (Support) 
(44%) and ESA (WRAG) (9%). This pattern reflects the widespread prevalence of 
barriers to work such as mental health problems, and drug/alcohol addictions, literacy 
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Findings
This section provides empirical evidence of the precariat’s experiences of the reformed 
welfare delivery system. It shows how this system drives people into destitution and 
crime rather than enforcing the norms of civilised behaviour. The present research 
has identified the importance of three key contributory factors:
•  the imposition of a white-collar model of support; 
•  linking the receipt of benefits to inappropriate measures of activation; 
•  the tying of ineffective support to benefit sanctions.
The imposition of a white-collar model of support
Jobcentre Plus advice
‘To make sure you keep up with the latest vacancies, you will need to: find ways of 
having access to the internet; have your own email address and know how to find 
vacancies and fill in applications online.’ (Jobcentre Plus, 2010: 12)
‘A CV is a short list of facts about you and your work history, skills, qualifications 
and experience. A good CV is essential when looking for work and it is worth 
spending time getting it right so it sells you to an employer.’ (Jobcentre Plus, 2010: 27)
Jobcentre Plus has developed a white-collar model of job search that is irrelevant 
to the needs of the precariat in the contemporary labour market. Using the internet 
to search for jobs and the adoption of curricula vitae are two key components. Yet 
Sassen (1996) has shown that economic restructuring has led to a shift of labour 
market functions such as recruitment for low-skilled work to the household or 
community. Respondents often reported that they found work through personal 
contacts or temporary employment agencies. The former has two key attractions. 
Individuals can personally vouch for the reliability of prospective employees; 
and it can restrict competition for available jobs which is highly prized for those 
that suffer employer discrimination. Moreover, CVs were often not used for 
gaining work:
‘People are giving up, and people are giving up because they don’t understand 
it in the first place. You’ve got to bring a CV in, and people are saying to me 
“What the fuck is a CV? I’ve never had a CV in my life.” But if you don’t 
want a CV you get sanctions.’ (Glasgow man, 27 years)
This focus reflects the trend evident from the late 1980s away from training programmes 
towards low-cost measures for immediate job preparation. The development of labour 
market pilots such as the Jobseeker Mandatory Activity, which provided extra support 
to the long-term unemployed, is an exemplar. The pilot comprised a three-day 
motivational course and three follow-up Jobcentre Plus personal adviser interviews. 
The official evaluation found: 
Many working class males, particularly those with a history of manual work, 
found it extremely difficult to relate to cognitive behavioural approaches and 




















































course materials. They often disliked exercises which were designed to reveal 
personal information such as their ten most admirable qualities. Furthermore, 
many felt embarrassed by a ‘guided fantasy’ exercise where individuals were 
encouraged to sit in front of their peers and relate a positive life experience. 
(Fletcher et al, 2008)
Respondents frequently complained that inappropriate support had been imposed 
on them, as described by an Edinburgh man aged 31 years: ‘One thing I hate about 
being on the dole is when you get put on some course and one of the first things 
they want to do is mess about with your CV.’ He had been repeatedly required to 
revise the CV in contradictory ways: ‘Well they called it tweaking it. It was about 
two and a half pages long. Somebody decided they wanted to make it smaller and 
then someone wanted to make it longer. Somebody wanted me to add this, that and 
the next thing. I said “Oh give it a rest”.’ A chronic lack of opportunities to improve 
human capital through vocational training was articulated by many: ‘You need more 
different support, and proper training in like bricklaying or something…not like 
what they do, like go in a room and you do a CV’ (Peterborough man aged 29 years). 
Consequently, a senior policy stakeholder reported: ‘Some of them get hugely pissed 
off because it’s the eighth time they’ve been shown how to write a CV, and they still 
haven’t got anything to put on it.’ 
The self-directed use of the Universal Jobmatch website is the mainstay of back-
to-work support. Most jobseekers are required to use the site and claims for JSA and 
Universal Credit usually cannot be made without first satisfying digital requirements 
(NAO, 2016). This has built a digital barrier that obstructs access to their entitlements 
(UN Special Rapporteur, 2018). The introduction of new technology was not 
accompanied with relevant training or guidance. ‘They used to have job point 
machines which they took out and didn’t replace them with computers for months 
and months. They give very little direction. It’s just a question of oh, just try this, just 
try that’ (Edinburgh man, aged 43 years). Some had incurred sanctions because of 
their inability to comply with their online obligations. An Edinburgh man aged 34 
years had received a four-week sanction ostensibly because he was unable to cut and 
paste job search information. He complained: ‘Well they’ve got all the computers 
and they want you to use computers and that, but yet if you ask for assistance there’s 
nobody to help you.’ This was contested by Jobcentre Plus staff who reported: ‘We did 
a huge amount of work with the digital agenda’. Nevertheless, they went on to recall 
two cases that underlined the problem: ‘One of my first persons that got sanctioned 
was living in a car, so they said it was really difficult for them to prove on a computer 
that they’d done 35 hours job search. We had to sanction a parent of a child that had 
just gone back to school but they had no computer skills at all.’ 
Linking the receipt of benefits to inappropriate measures of activation
A key goal of Jobcentre Plus is to assess whether benefit claimants are ‘active’ thus 
fulfilling the tutelary goals of paternalistic reformers. Consequently, official guidance 
is: ‘If you are receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance while you’re out of work, then you 
have to prove that you are “actively seeking work”. Keeping a record of what you’ve 
done to find work will help you show your adviser that you are doing all you can to 
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The present research, however, suggests that the Agency’s white-collar model of 
support means that it uses inappropriate measures of ‘activation’ for those engaged in 
precarious labour. This has meant that many are compelled to take part in a charade 
that not only fails to improve their employment prospects but entails the very real 
risk that they may lose benefits upon which they depend. There are three key aspects 
of this particular issue.
First, many do not understand the job search expectations placed upon them. An 
Edinburgh man aged 37 years was asked whether he knew what was on his Jobseeker’s 
Agreement replied: ‘Not really, no. I just signed it…I’m not sure what my agreement is. 
All I know is I’ve got to search for jobs.’ He explained his behaviour in the following 
way: ‘I was a bit nervous, and I didn’t want to question them too much. I just wanted 
to go in there [Jobcentre] and get out to be honest with you.’ Some agreed to 
anything because they felt it was a condition for getting their benefit. Others were 
so concerned to get their benefit that they signed regardless of its appropriateness. 
There was also widespread uncertainty and confusion about the number of jobs that 
individuals were required to apply for each week.
Second, the Universal Jobmatch site is the primary vehicle for gathering evidence 
of ‘activation’ and has been likened to a ‘virtual panopticon’ (Fletcher and Wright, 
2018). Several interviewees explicitly viewed it as a source of surveillance of their job 
seeking activities. This is a very unappealing prospect for those previously deprived of 
their liberty. ‘They’ll be so many jobs that I have to look for and you do it through 
their government website so they can check it’ (Peterborough man, aged 24 years). 
Moreover, this gives a misleading picture of job search activity because online methods 
are often not used to find work. A London man, aged 38 years, was required to make 
35 on-line job applications a week even though he usually secured work through 
his personal contacts. He spent up to 25 hours a week in a fruitless online search for 
jobs. Reflecting on these requirements he argued: ‘It’s got to be productive, it’s got 
to actually mean something rather than just an exercise in filling your time.’ 
Finally, this frequently brings them into conflict with work coaches and results 
in benefit sanctions. Some were superficially compliant with the directions of work 
coaches: ‘You just do what they tell you to do otherwise you’re not going to get any 
money’ (London man, 27 years). However, some had lied about the extent of their 
job search: ‘I just had to lie and say I’ve applied for all these jobs, because otherwise I 
would not have got the money’ (Bristol man, 27 years). A few had become frustrated 
and angry at the way they had been treated. ‘All he [personal adviser] was interested 
in was job search, job search, job search, that’s all he done. I mean shut up man, you 
know what I mean, you’re like a broken record. In fact I was even covering my hand 
saying “I’ll beak your jaw when I get you outside, you’re getting it”’ (Edinburgh 
man, 29 years).
Punitive support and sanctions
Many of those interviewed explicitly likened the support provided by Jobcentre Plus 
to punishment. There were two dimensions. First, some forms of support such as 
attendance at work clubs or participation in the Work Programme were regarded as 
diversionary activity. The primary purpose of which was not to prepare them for the 
labour market but to divert them from informal work or criminal activities: ‘It was 




















































blah, blah, for nine o’clock in the morning until half four in the afternoon then 
they’re not out working on the fly’ (Glasgow man, aged 37 years). It should be borne 
in mind that policymakers have consistently highlighted the supposed fraudulent 
behaviour of claimants.
More commonly, the minimal support provided by the Agency was so tightly bound 
to sanctioning activities that it is experienced as punitive because it increases exposure 
to sanctioning. This is exemplified by the much lower than expected number of prison 
leavers taking advantage of ‘day one’ access to the Work Programme (see DWP, 2014). 
From March 2012, all prison leavers who claim JSA including those claiming within 
13 weeks of leaving custody, were supposed to enter the Programme from ‘day one’. 
The rationale being that early intervention was the key to overcoming significant 
barriers to work and preventing re-offending. The indications from the present study 
are that poor previous experiences of training programmes and the programme’s strong 
association with sanctioning has stymied participation. A Sheffield woman aged 38 
years reported that in the first few weeks following release: ‘Your head is still inside.’ 
Consequently, Jobcentre Plus was primarily viewed as a benefits agency; many 
offenders find work (formal and informal) through their own social networks. A 
Glasgow man aged 39 years reported: ‘The only thing they’re [Jobcentre Plus] good 
for is your benefit. I’ve never had a job off them.’ Respondents frequently complained 
that the agency was too focused on ensuring compliance with mandatory benefit 
claim conditions rather than helping people into work: ‘All they cared about was, 
“Make sure you’ve got x amount of applications that you’ve applied for, and that 
you’ve put it on Universal Jobmatch”’ (London man, 29 years).
Access to unemployment benefits has traditionally been made conditional 
on unemployment being involuntary, with an expectation of active job search. 
Nevertheless, there have been a series of welfare reforms since the mid-1980s that 
have tightened eligibility criteria for benefits and introduced a system of sanctions for 
non-compliance. There has also been a dramatic increase in the severity of sanctions 
imposed for failure to satisfy work-related activity requirements. The original penalty 
of six weeks’ loss of benefit, which had existed from 1911 was increased to 28 weeks 
in 1988 and to three years in 2012. Moreover, sanctions have increasingly become the 
lived experience of benefit claimants with almost a quarter (24%) of all JSA claimants 
between 2010 and 2015 receiving at least one sanction (NAO, 2016).
The imposition of a white-collar model of support, the linking the receipt of benefits 
to inappropriate measures of activation combined with the multiple and complex 
needs of many claimants makes the precariat more susceptible to benefit sanctions. 
Over half (56%) of the offender sample had experienced a benefit sanction with 21 
per cent being sanctioned between two and five times and 5 per cent more than five 
times. Some had gone without benefits for periods of up to six months. Failure to 
attend interviews and the provision of insufficient evidence of job search were the 
principal reasons given. Drug addictions, mental health problems and literacy and 
numeracy problems underpinned the inability of many to meet their obligations and 
behave in the required fashion. A Sheffield man aged 26 years had been sanctioned 
within three weeks of his release from prison for not providing an adequate written 
record of job search. He explained: ‘Because I didn’t fill in my book properly, they 
didn’t really explain to me properly how to do it. I am a bit dyslexic; I can’t read or 
write practically.’ A sense of powerlessness often pervaded experiences of sanctioning. 
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inability to meet the terms of his benefit claim due to an undisclosed drug addiction: 
‘I never had the mental faculties to tell them, to explain it to them.’ 
Sanctioning failed to recognise barriers to employment or the specific circumstances 
of individuals. At one end of the spectrum sanctions were experienced as life 
threatening because they sparked suicidal thoughts. More commonly they worsened 
mental health conditions such as anxiety and depression with many reporting that they 
had been prescribed anti-depressants. Some had become more socially isolated: ‘Some 
days I would even stay in my house, I wasn’t coming out of it…I just felt worthless’ 
(London man, 38 years). Sanctions frequently resulted in life-changing crises, like 
eviction and homelessness, deep poverty, hunger leading to begging, foodbank use 
and destitution. ‘That [sanction] led to a period of homelessness’ (Sheffield man, 46 
years). They were decisive in initiating or worsening debt and rent arrears, for some, 
to the point of where daily financial management was no longer possible. In the 
short term, immediate emotional reactions to being sanctioned included confusion 
(particularly for those who believed that they had been compliant), anger, defiance 
and escapism: ‘I just found myself taking drugs and burying my head in the sand’ 
(Edinburgh man, 34 years).
A single JSA claimant aged 25 years or over loses £300 for a four-week sanction 
(NAO, 2016). Benefit sanctions differ from other financial penalties such as court fines 
in that they take immediate effect and individuals lose their only or main source of 
income causing disproportionate hardship (Adler, 2016). Some were able to prevail 
upon family and friends in order to cope with the financial loss. A London man aged 
27 years had been sanctioned twice for missing Jobcentre appointments and continued 
to receive financial support from his partner on both occasions. It was in this context 
that he declared: ‘They can take the dole money off me because the dole money’s not 
much. So I can go without the money.’ Another man had incurred a three-month 
sanction for failing to undertake sufficient job search. He responded by visiting soup 
kitchens and charities: ‘I can eat for seven days a week for nothing’ (London man, aged 
37 years). More generally, those using foodbanks are more likely to be unemployed 
and have experienced a benefit sanction (Perry et al, 2014). Furthermore, the rise in 
foodbank use is concentrated in communities where more people are experiencing 
benefit sanctions (Loopstra et al, 2015).
There are, however, practical limits on the extent to which individuals could rely on 
this support because of the impoverishment of their social networks. A London man 
aged 29 years reported: ‘I had to scrimp, save, flipping borrow and beg, everything just 
to survive…I didn’t really like asking my nan or any other of my friends because they’re 
all in the same predicament as me.’ Similarly, drug and alcohol problems experienced 
by many often meant that they were alienated from family members. ‘I’ve got no 
one I can ask for help, all my family are here, there and everywhere and hardly speak 
to me because I’m the black sheep of the family’ (Edinburgh man, aged 27 years).
Many reported that they undertook cash-in-hand work which was often secured 
through word-of-mouth or engaged in survival crime. A London man aged 35 years 
reported: ‘My brother-in-law’s a painter and decorator, so I get a lot of work with 
him. So he gives me like, £70 a day.’ A Bristol man aged 43 years had responded 
by ‘doing little jobs’. Survival crime was a more lucrative, albeit risky, response by 
some. Shoplifting, burglary and drug dealing were frequently mentioned as financial 
coping strategies. A Sheffield man aged 24 years reported: ‘I stole food because I was 




















































because we had no money. Otherwise we wouldn’t have had any food or anything.’ 
The engagement of some in criminal activities was reported to be the main reason 
why some individuals were unconcerned about receiving multiple sanctions: ‘I need 
my money, but some people don’t care. They will take that £56 because they’ve got 
other things on the backburner…so they would get sanctioned every week’ (London 
man, 39 years).
Conclusions
In this article, we have identified how the precariat encounter and experience the 
support provided by Jobcentre Plus. Our evidence demonstrates that the imposition 
of an inappropriate white-collar model of support combined with punitive benefit 
sanctions drives many people out of the benefit system and into destitution and crime. 
We argue that a century after the introduction of the labour exchange the primary 
role of its successor is to assess whether the unemployed are ‘active’. This has been 
interpreted by Marxist scholars as a class disciplinary project which renders labour 
more dependent upon low-wage and precarious work and imposes the disciplines of 
work on prospective workers (see Wacquant, 2009; Wiggan, 2015; Umney et al, 2018). 
However, our evidence is that ‘support’ when combined with sanctions frequently 
results in ill-discipline and disentitlement from benefits among the most marginalised 
fractions of the working class. Disentitlement may not necessarily reinforce low 
paid work because some respond by engaging in the informal economy or criminal 
endeavours. Consequently, Fox-Piven (2010: 115) argues that ‘a prison record hardly 
equips those released for wage labour, desocialized or otherwise’.
Some have argued that welfare reforms are a deliberate and targeted attempt at 
inculcating ‘civilised’ habits (see Rodger, 2012; Van den Berg and Arts, 2018). The 
normalisation of a middle-class (white-collar) support system that inculcates the 
‘civilised’ habits of digital skills and the use of curricula vitae could be seen as part 
of a ‘civilising offensive’. However, the support model has been brought about by 
very low funding levels, the hegemony of the work-first approach combined with 
a misunderstanding of the impact of economic change on working-class people. 
Lawler’s (2005) notion of the ‘public bourgeoisie’ which views the working class as 
foundationally ‘other’ to a middle-class existence that is silently marked as normal 
may be useful. ‘Narratives of lack’ which is not primarily a lack of material resources 
but a lack of ‘taste’, knowledge and the ‘right ways of being and doing’ (Bourdieu, 
1986: 511) and ‘narratives of decline’ define the public bourgeoisie’s representations 
of the working class. Deficit narratives were frequently evident in the focus group 
discussions with welfare practitioners (lack of punctuality, manners and self-control) 
and official guidance to the unemployed which intones: ‘Don’t sit down until the 
interviewer asks you to. [Don’t] Fidget, slouch in the chair or fold your arms. [Don’t] 
Swear (even mildly). [Don’t] Criticise your past employers. [Don’t] Interrupt…[Don’t] 
Lie or be too enthusiastic’ (Jobcentre Plus, 2010: 38).
Jobcentre Plus support cannot be conceptualised as a part of a ‘civilising offensive’ 
because it is not a deliberate and targeted attempt at inculcating ‘civilised’ behaviour. 
Moreover, the present research has underlined its de-civilising effects which have 
deprived individuals of their benefits and led to devastating effects such as increased 
poverty and destitution, homelessness, worsening mental health and movements into 
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to go out and steal and it didn’t feel wrong because I just thought if I get caught it 
would be doing me a favour. I would have gone to the court and said: “Look don’t let 
me back out because I’ve no option and I’m going to do it again.”’ Some indicated 
that their experiences had made them discontinue benefit claims. A Bristol man aged 
27 years reported: ‘I just gave it up [the benefit claim] and didn’t bother with it again. 
Carried on just going out every day thieving.’ The irony is that this will have been 
recorded as a positive outcome by the Agency’s performance management system.
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